NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
REVIEW
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 6

4-1-2022

Mass Incarceration, Deprivation of Rights, and Racial
Subordination: U.S. v. Gary, the American Gun Control Narrative,
and the Ugly Truth Behind 18 U.S.C. 922(g)
Andrew Arden

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nccvlrts
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Arden, Mass Incarceration, Deprivation of Rights, and Racial Subordination: U.S. v. Gary, the
American Gun Control Narrative, and the Ugly Truth Behind 18 U.S.C. 922(g), 2 N.C. CVL. RTS. L. REV. 141
(2022).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nccvlrts/vol2/iss1/6

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Civil Rights Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

MASS INCARCERATION, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS,
AND RACIAL SUBORDINATION: U.S. V. GARY, THE
AMERICAN GUN CONTROL NARRATIVE, AND UGLY
TRUTH BEHIND 18 U.S.C. 922(G)
ANDREW J. ARDEN*
“Any unarmed people are slaves or are subject to slavery at
any given moment. . . There is a world of difference between
thirty million unarmed, submissive Black people and thirty
million Black people armed with freedom and defense guns
and
the
strategic
methods
of
liberation.”1
- Huey P. Newton, Co-Founder and Minister of Defense,
Black Panther Party for Self Defense
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INTRODUCTION
America’s history of white supremacy has influenced every facet of
our legal system—gun control legislation is no different. Regulation of the
right to bear arms has been highly racialized since the days of chattel slavery,
when slaveowners sought to disarm and dominate Black Americans to
prevent insurrection.2 After the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
facially racist Black Codes were justified with openly racist rhetoric.3
Following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Black Codes openly denying Black Americans
their Second Amendment rights gave way to more facially neutral policies,4
but the intent to disarm and dominate Black Americans remained the same.
In the past half century, the criminalization of gun ownership has
disproportionately affected poor and Black Americans. As this paper
demonstrates, although the methods of domination and oppression have
changed, from chattel slavery to mass incarceration, the effect, oppression
and maintenance of white supremacy through disarmament of Black
Americans, remains unchanged. In many federal court districts, 18 U.S.C. §

2

Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 67, 68–
70 (1991).
3

See generally Black Codes, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/black-codes (last visited July 28, 2021).
4

See, e.g., National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5849).
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922(g) contributes more to the incarceration of disproportionately poor and
Black Americans than any other federal statute.5
This recent development explores United States v. Gary, a recent
Fourth Circuit case interpreting § 922(g),6 and places it squarely in the
context of this racialized history. Section 922(g) criminalizes possession or
attempt to possess a firearm by a number of classes of individuals, including
felons,7 those addicted to a controlled substance, those convicted of a
misdemeanor domestic violence offense, and those with an active domestic
violence protective order against them.8 The vast majority of defendants
charged under § 922(g) are charged under § 922(g)(1), for their status as a
felon.9 In Gary, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when a court
fails to confirm that a defendant is aware of their relevant status, that court
has committed a structural error that isn’t amenable to plain error review, and
the case must automatically be remanded.10 This decision contradicts the nine
other circuit courts to address the issue, which have held that a court’s failure
to confirm a defendant’s awareness of their qualifying status is not a
structural error.11 A motion for the court’s en banc review was denied.12 In a
concurrence with the denial of an en banc hearing, Judge Wilkinson
suggested that the panel’s decision was “so incorrect and on an issue of such
importance that I think the Supreme Court should consider it promptly. Any
5

See generally, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A
FIREARM
(2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/quick-facts/Felon_In_Possession_FY20.pdf.
6

954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020).

7

This recent development uses the term “felon” to refer to people convicted of a felony.
While people-first language is generally preferred, felon is used here because this this term
refers to the legal status of these individuals. Individuals convicted of a felony are referenced
this way in practice and statute, and the thesis of this recent development highlights how
§ 922(g)(1) reduces people convicted of a felony to their status.
8

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-(9).

9

See U.S.SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5.

10

954 F.3d at 198.

11

See United States v. Burghardt, 939 F.3d 397, 403–05 (1st Cir. 2019); United States
v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Denson, 774 F. App’x 184, 185
(5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853, 857–58 (6th Cir. 2020); United States
v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 973–75 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Hollingshed, 940 F.3d
410, 415–16 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Fisher, 796 F. App’x 504, 510–11 (10th Cir.
2019); United States v. McLellan, 958 F.3d 1110, 1118–20 (11th Cir. 2020).
12

United States v. Gary, 963 F.3d 420, 421 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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en banc proceedings would only be a detour.”13 A petition was filed with the
Supreme Court, which heard the case in April, 2021, consolidated in Greer
v. United States.14 The Supreme Court ultimately sided almost unanimously
with Wilkinson – save for a partial concurrence and partial dissent by Justice
Sotomayor – overturning the Fourth Circuit panel decision.
This recent development argues that the Fourth Circuit panel was right
in determining that failure to confirm relevant status is a structural error,
particularly given the racialized context of § 922(g) and the racialized history
of U.S. gun control legislation generally. Part I of the piece provides
background by exploring the racialized history of gun control legislation in
America, as well as the racialized narrative that has repeatedly been used to
justify gun control legislation. Part II discusses how modern gun control
legislation, particularly 922(g)(1), contributes to the mass incarceration of
Black and indigent defendants. Part III then examines the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in Gary and the circuit split that case created on structural error in §
922(g) cases. Part IV next considers Gary in light of a history of racially
motivated gun control legislation to demonstrate why the Fourth Circuit panel
was correct in identifying Gary’s guilty plea as a structural error. It posits
that, more broadly, the Supreme Court’s denial of plain error review in cases
where a defendant does not know about their § 922(g) status will
disproportionately harm Black and indigent defendants. A failure to
recognize this error as a structural one only compounds the disproportionate
impact of § 922(g) on Black and indigent defendants’ Second Amendment
rights.
I. THE RACIALIZED HISTORY OF GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION
Gun control in the United States has long been a tool of racial
oppression. Throughout American history, firearm legislation has been used
to disarm and criminalize Black and Hispanic Americans for the purpose of
repressing social movements, forcing economic subserviency, and
reinforcing White supremacy.15 Acknowledgement of this context is

13

Id.

14

141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021).

15

Tahmassebi, supra note 2, at 68–69.
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paramount to understanding the implications of § 922(g) and U.S. v. Gary for
the criminal justice system’s disproportionately poor defendants of color.16
Throughout our country’s history, gun control legislation has served
as much as an experiment in racial control as it has served to protect
Americans. The development of chattel slavery in the American colonies was
accompanied by the enactment of laws restricting the right to bear arms on
the basis of race.17 In 1640, Virginia passed the first of these restrictive laws,
which excluded Black people from the classes of people permitted to own a
firearm.18 Fear of slave uprisings in the later Seventeenth and early
Eighteenth Centuries prompted further legislation restricting Black firearm
ownership, including a 1712 law from South Carolina titled “An Act for the
Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Slaves,”19 and Virginia’s “An
Act for Preventing Negroes Insurrections,” both of which instituted complete,
race-based bans on firearm ownership by enslaved and freed Black
Americans.20
Racial control through gun legislation continued even after the formal
abolition of slavery following the American Civil War. Southern states
adopted “Black Codes,” or sets of regulations that denied newly freed Black
citizens many of the rights that white citizens were constitutionally
guaranteed.21 These Black Codes frequently forbade freed Black Americans
from bearing arms, rendering these newly-freed men and women defenseless
against a litany of racially motivated assaults.22 The overwhelming majority
of these Black Codes remained in place until the passage of the Civil Rights
Act in 1866.23

16

This essay does not attempt to argue the public safety merits of some forms of gun
control legislation. Rather, it focuses on the implications when some forms of gun control
are racially motivated in their creation or administration.
17

Tahmassebi, supra note 8, at 69.

18

Id.

19

7 Stat. 346 (S.C. 1690), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES
CAROLINA 346 (D.J. McCord ed., 1840).
20

AT LARGE OF

SOUTH

2 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS FROM VIRGINIA,
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 481 (W.W. Henning
ed., 1823).
21

See generally Black Codes, supra note 3.

22

Tahmassebi, supra note 2, at 71.

23

78 U.S.C. § 241.
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The Civil Rights Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution which gave Congress the power to pass it, required States to pass
laws that were racially neutral—at least on their face.24 Lawmakers had little
difficulty pivoting to facially neutral laws intended to disarm Blacks. Some
states such as Tennessee and Arkansas responded by banning cheap
handguns, the only firearms that newly freed Black people could usually
afford, through “Saturday Night Special” laws which criminalized
distribution of small, low quality, and easily concealable handguns.25 Other
states, including Alabama, Texas, and Virginia, chose instead to price Blacks
and poor whites out of gun ownership through the imposition of exorbitant
business and transaction taxes on handguns.26 In 1902 South Carolina banned
all pistol sales except to sheriffs and their special deputies, a group which
often included numerous members of the Ku Klux Klan.27 In 1911, New
York, fueled by racial stereotypes about Black Americans and immigrants,
and in an effort to disarm union organizers, enacted the Sullivan Law, which
made handgun ownership illegal for anyone without a police-issued permit.28
These permits were then systematically denied to the very groups the Sullivan
Law intended to disarm.29 Similar police permit systems followed in
Arkansas, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Oregon.30 As a result of these restrictive gun policies, Black Americans were
left without firearm protection as violent white supremacists, including
members of the Klan, once again became a major force of racialized violence,

24

Id.

25

Tahmassebi, supra note 2 at 73. See generally STEVE EKWALL, THE RACIST ORIGINS
US GUN CONTROL: LAWS DESIGNED TO DISARM SLAVES, FREEDMEN, AND AFRICANAMERICANS, https://www.sedgwickcounty.org/media/29093/the-racist-origins-of-us-guncontrol.pdf (providing a timeline of racially disparate gun control legislation in America from
1640–1995).
OF

26

Tahmassebi, supra note 2, at 74–75.

27

See id. at 76; Timothy Winkle, When Watchmen Were Klansmen, NAT’L MUSEUM
AM. HIST., BEHRING CTR. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/watchmen;
see also, e.g., Klan Chief Is Deputy Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1968).
28

Tahmassebi, supra note 2, at 77.

29

Id. at 77–79.

30

Id.
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perpetrating beatings, lynchings, and murders against unarmed Black
Americans throughout the early twentieth century.31
Racialized gun control laws were also enacted at the federal level.
Lawmakers passed the first federal gun control legislation of the twentieth
century, the National Firearms Act (NFA), in 1934.32 The law was supported
by the NRA and imposed steep tax and registration requirements on so-called
“gangster” guns, machine guns, and sawed-off shotguns.33 These restrictions
disproportionately disarmed Black Americans and other poor minorities, who
were largely priced out of the firearms market en masse.34 A larger and more
racially-motivated step in federal gun control legislation came thirty years
later, with the Gun Control Act of 1968.35 Here, history is unequivocal: the
Gun Control Act was a racially motivated reaction to the violence of the Civil
Rights Movement and the growing agency of Black Americans that was
afforded in part by their utilization of firearms.36 Robert Sherrill, former
correspondent for The Nation and gun control advocate, argued in his book
The Saturday Night Special that “The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed
not to control guns but to control blacks, and inasmuch as a majority of
Congress did not want to do the former but were ashamed to show that their
goal was the latter.”37
The racist intent of the Gun Control Act is illustrated by lawmakers’
reactions to the Black Panther Party. In the face of police violence against
Black Americans, the Black Panther Party had begun openly carrying

31

Id. at 78; see also David Schenk, Freedmen with Firearms: White Terrorism and
Black Disarmament During Reconstruction, 4 GETTYSBURG COLL. J. CIV. WAR ERA 9 (2014)
(detailing the history of Black disarmament in the reconstruction and post reconstruction
south and KKK targeting of unarmed Blacks).
32

National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5849).
33

Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/.
34

J. Baxter Stegall, The Curse of Ham: Disarmament Through Discrimination - the

Necessity of Applying Strict Scrutiny to Second Amendment Issues in Order To Prevent
Racial Discrimination by States and Localities Through Gun Control Laws, 11 LIB. U. L.
REV. 272, 299–300 (2016).
35

Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-31).
36

Winkler, supra note 31.

37

ROBERT SHERILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 280 (1973).
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handguns and assault rifles by 1967.38 Members of the party engaged in
“copwatching,” openly carrying at protests and in the streets to police the
police and protect Black Americans from police violence.39 On May 2, 1967,
30 fully-armed Black Panthers demonstrated at the California State Capitol
in protest of government infringement on their right to bear arms –
particularly Republican Assemblyman Don Mulford’s bill to repeal open
carry in California.40 This demonstration further stoked white establishment
fear of Black armament, and the aforementioned bill was quickly passed, with
the Mulford Act being signed into law by then-California Governor Ronald
Reagan on July 28, 1967.41 Federally, the attitude of the white establishment
mirrored that of California, as the Mulford Act was closely followed
nationally by the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, with support of
unlikely allies such as the NRA.42 The Gun Control Act imposed a number
of restrictions on the sale and transfer of firearms, including restricting the
importation of cheap military surplus weapons popular with the Black
Panther Party and the Black community.43 The law also prohibited certain
people from owning guns, including people who had been convicted of a
felony.44 That section of the law is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Racially motivated gun control did not end with the Gun Control Act
of 1968. As part of a national movement towards “tough on crime” policy,
the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Chicago Police Department
enacted and enforced Operation Clean Sweep, an official policy which
applied to all housing units owned and operated by the CHA, in 1988.45 The
program confiscated firearms from public housing tenants through

38

See Winkler, supra note 33.

39

See John Metta, Racism and the Black Hole of Gun Control in the US, AL JAZEERA
(Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/11/23/racism-and-the-blackhole-of-gun-control-in-the-us.
40

Thad Morgan, The NRA Supported Gun Control When Black Panthers Had Weapons,
HISTORY (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/black-panthers-gun-control-nrasupport-mulford-act.
41

Id.

42

Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-31); see Morgan, supra note 40.
43

See Winkler, supra note 33.

44

18 U.S.C. § 922.

45

Ekwall, supra note 25, at 11.
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warrantless searches.46 The constitutionality of operation clean sweep was
repeatedly challenged, and eventually in 1994 it was struck down for
violating of the Fourth Amendment by a federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.47 Then-President Clinton
responded by ordering his attorney general to help Chicago develop an
alternative search policy, adding “[w]e must not allow criminals to find
shelter in the public housing community they terrorize,”48 scapegoating and
villainizing Black felons in the process of justifying sweep policies. In a
similar case, in 1990, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia upheld a ban imposed by the Richmond Housing Authority on the
possession of all firearms, whether operable or not, in public housing
projects.49 The Clinton Administration tried and failed to enact a similar ban
in federal public housing in 1994.50
As this history demonstrates, America’s long experiment with gun
control legislation is the product of, and reinforces, a pervasive and racist
narrative and political order. This narrative takes the shape of a dichotomy
familiar in politics––that of the protective, heroic white homeowner who
owns a firearm to hunt or protect his family, and the Black criminal “thug”
who the white firearm owner needs protection from. This narrative has been
constructed and deployed throughout American history to justify gun control
policy that disarms and criminalizes Black Americans while affirming the
right of white people to arm themselves at home, in public, and even in
political spaces.51 “Throughout the history of this country, the rhetoric of gun
46

Id.

47

Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 796–97 (N.D. Ill. 1994).

48

William J. Clinton, Statement on the District Court Decision on Chicago's
"Operation Clean Sweep", AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 7, 1994),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-district-court-decisionchicagos-operation-clean-sweep. Though many felons are barred from public housing, some
felons can qualify for § 8 HUD public housing programs, depending on how their state
administers these programs and the specific felony of which they were convicted.
49

Ekwall, supra note 25, at 12. See Richmond Tenants Org. v. Richmond Dev. & Hous.
Auth., No. C.A. 3:90CV00576 (E.D.Va. Dec. 3, 1990).
50
51

Id.

See, e.g., Coronavirus: Armed protesters enter Michigan statehouse, BBC (May 1,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52496514; Abigail Censky, Heavily
Armed Protesters Gather Again At Michigan Capitol To Decry Stay-At-Home Order, NPR
(May 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/14/855918852/heavily-armed-protesters-
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rights has been selectively manipulated and utilized to inflame white racial
anxiety, and to frame Blackness as an inherent threat.”52 From Slave Codes
motivated by the fear of insurrection, to the war on drugs and “law and order”
rhetoric of the 1970s and 1980s,53 racial subordination has remained a
carefully (and not so carefully) couched motivator of American gun control
legislation. In the past fifty years, such legislation has contributed extensively
to the mass incarceration of Black and poor Americans.
II. THE IMPACT OF §922(G) AND OTHER MODERN GUN CONTROL STATUTES ON
MASS INCARCERATION OF BLACK AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
Gun control discourse in America is not only racist; it also continues
to center criminalization as a solution to gun violence. Section 922(g) is
among the laws that criminalizes firearm possession, and, as a result, has
contributed significantly to the mass incarceration of Black and poor
Americans. In 2019, 76,538 cases charging unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon were reported to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.54 Of these,
7,647 involved convictions under § 922(g), accounting for over 85% of
federal firearm-related convictions.55 Nearly 98% of the people convicted
were men, and over 55% were Black.56 In the Middle District of North
Carolina, § 922(g) cases accounted for over one third of total criminal
convictions in 2019.57 Over 97% of the people convicted of federal felonies
for unlawful firearm possession were given active prison sentences averaging
64 months.58 Of those sentenced to prison, 15.6% were convicted of violating
gather-again-at-michigans-capitol-denouncing-home-order; Associated Press, White
bystanders armed with rifles watch Floyd protesters march in Indiana, POLITICO (June 5,
2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/05/george-floyd-protests-armed-whitebystanders-indiana-303143.
52

2021),
arms/.

Ines Santos, Do Black Americans Have the Right To Bear Arms?, ACLU (July 16,
https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/do-black-people-have-the-right-to-bear-

53

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS,
45–58 (2012) (discussing President Nixon’s use of “law and order” rhetoric to villainize
Black Americans).
54

U.S.SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.
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one or more statutes that carry a mandatory minimum sentence.59 The
draconian mandatory minimums for firearm-related offenses arise from 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), which establishes a series of mandatory minimum sentences
ranging from five years to life for people who possess, brandish, or use a
firearm during a crime involving drugs or violence—even if the gun was
legally acquired or sitting at home unloaded during the commission of the
offense.60
As with the war on drugs and other “tough on crime” policies, the war
on guns has created a number of negative outcomes for communities which
further increase incarceration including aggressive policing on city streets,
like “stop-and-frisk” policies.61 Police stop-and-frisk policies are often
criticized for targeting people of color for drug possession and open warrants
en masse.62 While these criticisms are correct, stop-and-frisk has also been
successfully weaponized to target and incarcerate gun owners of color.63
The impact of gun legislation on prison populations has been astounding.
A 2014 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that fifty-one
thousand people were locked up in state custody for public-order offenses
involving a weapon—“carrying, exhibiting, firing, possessing, or selling a
weapon.”64 That’s nearly four percent of the total prison population in the
states.65 In the federal system, 30,500 people were incarcerated on weapons
offenses as of the end of September 2014, or 15.8 percent of the total federal
prison population.66 These numbers likely underrepresent the true
incarcerated population that has been convicted of firearm offenses or had
their sentences increased by a firearm charge, because the Bureau of Justice
Statistics only classifies offenders by their most serious offense.67 Nearly a
quarter of the 94,678 federal prisoners classified as drug offenders in 2012
59

Id.

60

18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

61

Daniel Denvir, A Better Gun Control, JACOBIN (Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/gun-control-mass-incarceration-drug-war-nrashooters.
62

Id.

63

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).

64

E. ANN CARSON, PH.D., U.S. DEPT.
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf.
65

Id.

66

Id. at 30.

67

Id.

OF

JUST., PRISONERS

IN

2014, 16 (2015),
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(sentenced since 1998) received a sentence involving weapons.68 Roughly
three quarters of federal drug offenders are also Black or Hispanic.69
III. U.S. V. GARY AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON STRUCTURAL ERROR
A. U.S. v. Gary
The case of Michael Andrew Gary is just one example of how formerly
incarcerated people of color become reinvolved in the criminal justice system
as a result of § 922(g).70 Gary was arrested on January 17, 2017, in Columbia,
South Carolina, following a traffic stop for driving on a suspended license.71
Gary’s cousin, Denzel Dixon, was a passenger in the vehicle.72 Officers
searched Gary’s vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and a small plastic
bag containing nine grams of marijuana.73 Gary admitted to possessing both
the gun and marijuana and was charged with the misdemeanor for violating
South Carolina’s open carry ban.74
Five months later, on June 16, 2017, Gary and Dixon were again
approached by police while parked in a motel parking lot.75 The officers
reportedly smelled marijuana and decided to approach the vehicle.76 When
the officers confronted Gary and Dixon, they found Dixon holding a joint.77
Gary and Dixon consented to a search of their persons, in which officers
found large amounts of cash on both men and a digital scale in Dixon’s

68

SAM TAXY, JULIE SAMUELS & WILLIAM ADAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., DRUG
OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON: ESTIMATES OF CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf.
69

Id. at 3.

70

United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2020).

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 199.

74

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-30(C) (2008). In their panel opinion, the Fourth Circuit
mistakenly characterized this as a “charge[ ] under state law with possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon.” Gary’s brief to the Supreme Court confirms that he was first charged
under § 16-23-30. See Brief in Opposition at 1 n.1, United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (4th
Cir. 2020) (No. 20-444).
75

Gary, 954 F.3d at 198.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 199.
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pocket.78 Gary and Dixon then consented to a vehicle search, where the
officers found a stolen firearm, ammunition, “large amounts” of marijuana in
the trunk, and baggies inside a backpack.79 Gary claimed possession of the
firearm and said that he regularly carried a firearm for protection.80 Dixon
admitted to possession of the marijuana.81 Gary was arrested and charged
under state law with possession of a stolen handgun.82 At the time of the
arrest, Gary had a prior felony conviction for which he had not been
pardoned.83
Soon, federal authorities got involved. A federal grand jury in the District
of South Carolina indicted Gary on two counts—one for his conduct on
January 17, 2017 and one for his conduct on June 16, 2017—of possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).84 The
state charges were subsequently dropped, and Gary plead guilty to the two
federal charges without a plea agreement.85 During his plea colloquy, as
required by law,86 the government recited facts related to each of his firearm
possession charges.87 The court also informed Gary of the elements the
government would be required to prove if he went to trial:88 (1) that Gary had
“been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year;” (2) that he “possessed a firearm;” (3) that the firearm “travelled in
interstate or foreign commerce;” and (4) that Gary possessed the firearm
“knowingly; that is that he knew the item was a firearm and his possession of
it was both voluntary and intentional.”89 Gary was not however informed of
an additional element of his offense—that “he knew he had the relevant status
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when he possessed the firearm,” in this case, the status of being a convicted
felon.90 Under Rehaif v. United States, this lack of information becomes
problematic.91 In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must know,
at the time that he possessed the firearm, that he had been convicted of a
felony in order to violate § 992(g)(1).92 For Gary, this burden was never met.
The district court nevertheless accepted Gary’s guilty plea and sentenced him
to 84 months in prison for each count, to run concurrently.93
Gary then appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.94 Gary asserted that Rehaif, as well as the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in
Lockhart,95 require his case be vacated because he pled guilty to two
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) without being informed that the offenses
require he know his prohibited status at the time he possessed the firearm.96
The Fourth Circuit did not question whether Gary’s rights under Rehaif had
been violated, but instead defined the question at hand as “whether a
standalone Rehaif error required automatic vacatur of a defendant’s guilty
plea, or whether the error should instead be reviewed for prejudice under
United States v. Olano.”97
Chief Judge Gregory, writing for the panel, held that “a standalone
Rehaif error satisfies plain error review because such an error is structural,
which per se affects a defendant’s substantial rights.”98 The panel thus held
that Gary should be automatically remanded for structural error. The state
petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was denied.99 In his concurrence
90
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denying the en banc hearing, Judge Wilkinson argued that the Rehaif error
could not have affected Gary’s substantial rights because there was “no
possibility . . . that Gary would not have pled guilty had he been informed of
that which the government could so easily have proven.”100 Similarly, Justice
Kavanaugh, writing for the majority in Greer (with which Gary was
consolidated), agreed, adding that mere omission of an element of an offense
(the Rehaif element here) does not alone render a guilty plea invalid.101 I
disagree.
B. The Substantial Rights Issue
To succeed under plain error review, a defendant must show that: (1) an
error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his
substantial rights.102 Courts will generally correct such an error only if the
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”103
Gary argued that the first two prongs of plain error review were
established by the decision in Rehaif itself—that an error occurred and that it
was plain.104 Gary also argues that the third element, an effect on his
substantial rights, is also met, because he could not have knowingly and
intelligently plead guilty without notice that the government was required to
prove the Rehaif element, thus rendering his plea constitutionally invalid.105
The first two prongs of plain error review are not contested in Gary. The
government concedes that the district court did err in failing to inform Gary
of the Rehaif element.106 The government contends however, and Judge
Wilkinson agrees, that omission of this element from the plea colloquy did
not affect Gary’s substantial rights, because there is overwhelming evidence
that he knew of his felony status prior to possessing the firearms.107 The
government and Wilkinson also defer to the nine other circuits that have
considered this question since Rehaif was decided, all of which held that there
100
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is no effect on a defendant’s substantial rights where the evidence shows that
the defendant knew of their status as a prohibited person at the time of their
gun possession.108 However, Gary’s case differs from the prior circuit
decisions referred to by the government and Wilkinson in a significant way—
those courts did not consider whether the district court’s acceptance of a
guilty plea without informing the defendant of every element of the offense
was a constitutional error that rendered his guilty plea invalid.109
Consequently, those circuit decisions do not directly answer the question
posed in Gary, whether this error is a structural error that affects the
substantial rights of the defendant.
In his concurrence denying rehearing en banc, Wilkinson nonetheless
sided with all nine other Circuits that have weighed in on this issue, refusing
to accept Rehaif error as a structural one. Gary then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.110 The writ was granted, and the
Supreme Court heard the case, consolidated in Greer v. United States on
April 20, 2021.111 Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh held that in
felon-in-possession cases under § 922(g)(1), a Rehaif error alone is not a basis
for plain-error relief.112 Kavanaugh further held that plain-error relief can
only be granted in Rehaif error cases when the defendant can demonstrate on
appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact
know he was a felon.113
IV. GARY’S GUILTY PLEA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID, AND THUS
AFFECTS HIS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AS A PER SE MATTER.
Gary’s guilty plea was “constitutionally invalid,” because it was
accepted without Gary being informed of the Rehaif element of the offense,
and therefore the plea colloquy could not have been voluntarily and
intelligibly entered into by Gary. Because Gary was not informed of the
Rehaif element at his plea, what he did plead guilty to would not be a crime.
The district court’s error in accepting his unconstitutional guilty plea is a
108
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structural one, because it infringed upon his autonomy interest, or his interest
in “mak[ing] his own choices about the proper way to protect his own
liberty.”114 As a structural error, it affects his substantial rights regardless of
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence or whether the error affected the
ultimate outcome of the proceedings.
Generally, for an error to be considered structural, it must have affected
the outcome of district court proceedings.115 However, the Supreme Court
has recognized that where a conviction is based on a constitutionally invalid
guilty plea, such as in Gary, even overwhelming evidence that the defendant
would have pled guilty regardless does not validate the conviction.116 In
Bousley v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea is
constitutionally valid only to the extent it is “voluntary” and “intelligent.”117
A plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives
“real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process.”
It is on this key point that Judge Wilkinson – and subsequently Justice
Kavanaugh –misidentify the issue with Gary’s conviction. Wilkinson argues
that the “Rehaif error could thus not have affected his substantial rights
because there is no possibility, not to mention a reasonable probability, that
Gary would not have pled guilty had he been informed of that which the
government could so easily have proven.”118 In Greer, Justice Kavanaugh
writes similarly that because Gary had been convicted of multiple felonies,
to which he admitted at his plea colloquy, there is no reasonable probability
that his outcome would be any different had he been informed of the Rehaif
element.119 This analysis is at best misplaced, and at worst intentionally
misleading. As in Bousley, the question in the case of a constitutionally
invalid guilty plea is not whether there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would have pled the same if they were informed of the Rehaif
element; the question is instead whether the defendant's substantial rights
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were violated by omission of the Rehaif element.120 Kavanaugh asserts that
neither Gary nor Greer’s substantial rights were in fact violated, because the
omission of an element in a criminal proceeding, including jury instructions
and plea colloquies, does not necessarily render a criminal proceeding unfair
or unreliable, and is thus not a structural error that must be overturned.121 In
other words, Kavanaugh asserts that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty
to an incomplete set of elements that, without the missing element, does not
amount to a crime, this is not a structural error. Recall that Courts will
generally only correct a structural error when it “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”122 Suggesting that this
– pleading guilty to an incomplete set of elements that does not constitute a
crime – could amount to anything but a lack of fairness and integrity, making
a mockery of our judicial system, is an absurd disregard for the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections normally available to criminal defendants.
A. The constitutional error in Gary is a structural error because it
violates Gary’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Based on the Rehaif precedent from the Supreme Court, the Fourth
Circuit panel found the district court’s error in Gary’s case to be structural,
or affecting substantial rights regardless of impact on the trial.123 The panel
was correct here. This error is structural because it violated Gary’s right to
make a fundamental choice regarding his own defense in violation of his
Sixth Amendment autonomy interest, and because he was deprived of his
autonomy interest under the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause; the
consequences of these deprivations in Gary’s case are impossible to quantify.
The Sixth Amendment contemplates that “the accused ... is the master
of his own defense,” and thus certain decisions, including whether to waive
the right to a jury trial and to plead guilty, are reserved for the defendant.124
Gary had a constitutional right to arrive at his own informed decision on
whether to exercise his right to go to trial or to submit a plea of guilty. When
the district court accepted Gary’s guilty plea after misinforming him of the
120
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elements that the state needed to prove, the court unduly prejudiced his
decision about how best to protect his liberty. Contrary to Judge Wilkinson’s
concurrence, Gary has no burden to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the
error, because harm to a defendant is irrelevant to his or her Sixth
Amendment right to make an informed decision.125 What Gary pled guilty to
was an incomplete set of elements which, under Rehaif, does not constitute a
crime. Because he was misinformed of the elements of the crime he thought
he was pleading guilty to, he thus lacked the ability to come to an informed
decision when the plea was entered.
Similarly, Gary was denied his Fifth Amendment due process clause
rights. When he pled guilty, he waived his right to a trial by jury, his privilege
against self-incrimination, and his right to confront his accusers. Informed by
the Supreme Court holding in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Fourth
Circuit panel finds a structural error where “the precise effect of the violation
cannot be ascertained.”126 It is simply not possible to quantify what impact
Gary’s waiving of constitutional rights based on an unconstitutional plea
could have had. There is no way for the court to know how Gary’s counsel,
but for the error, would have advised him, what evidence may have been
presented in his defense, and what choice Gary would have ultimately made
about accepting a plea or going to trial if he had been informed of the Rehaif
element. With no way to gauge the intangible impact of an unconstitutional
guilty plea, the panel found there was no way to determine whether the error
was harmless or not.127
A defendant’s status is the defining element of a §922(g) offense.128
Whether or not a defendant knowingly meets the status element of a §922(g)
offense is the difference between innocent and incarcerated. Unfortunately
for Michael Andrew Gary, the district court failed to inform him of this
element, and thus his decision to waive his constitutional rights was based on
an error that is uncontestably unconstitutional. Gary’s Sixth and Fifth
Amendment rights were violated when the district court accepted his
constitutionally invalid plea, depriving him of due process and his autonomy
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interest in making an informed and intelligent decision on how best to protect
his liberty. The panel was correct in vacating his plea and remanding his trial.
B. Like §922(g) generally, refusing structural error in these cases
disproportionately harms Black and indigent defendants
The implications of this structural error issue reach far beyond Michael
Gary, compounding the racially disparate impacts of gun control legislation
like The Gun Control Act of 1968. As illustrated above, Section 922(g) was
passed in order to prevent the armament of Black Americans.129 The law has
been successful in preventing a disproportionate number of Black Americans
from owning guns.130 Holding that the omission of the Rehaif element is not
a structural error would continue that racialized legacy. Such a holding would
offer fewer protections to those being prosecuted under § 922(g) than other
defendants in the criminal justice system, who are entitled to know what
they’re pleading to and cannot be convicted, even by a guilty plea, for an act
that does not meet all of the elements of an offense. Because § 922(g)
defendants are disproportionally Black and indigent,131 the defendants who
are stripped of this basic right of criminal adjudication in § 922(g) cases will
also be disproportionally Black and indigent, further perpetuating race and
class disparities within our criminal justice system.
In cases where § 922(g) defendants accept guilty pleas, as Gary did, these
disparities are compounded further. An overwhelming 97% of criminal cases
are resolved by guilty plea.132 Of those cases, Black defendants are more
likely than white defendants to be offered plea bargains with an active prison
sentence and are less likely to be offered a charge reduction.133 Indigent
defendants face additional pressure to accept guilty pleas, as a lack of funding
129
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and high caseloads often lead public defenders to encourage clients to accept
a plea bargain.134 Additionally, the costs of litigation, as well as time in
pretrial detention for those that cannot afford bail, can be coercive in
nature,135 further driving defendants towards guilty pleas. These impacts
weigh heavily on Black defendants, who are disproportionately likely to be
poor and indigent.136
In addition to being more likely to be indigent, Black defendants,
particularly young Black men, represent the majority of § 922(g)(1)
defendants. As noted above,137 a 2020 sentencing commission report found
that in fiscal year 2019, 98% of the nearly 8,000 defendants convicted of a §
922(g) offense were male, and over 55% were Black.138 Their average age
was 35.139 Because over 90% of these defendants are pleading guilty and
receiving racially disparate sentencing outcomes,140 Rehaif error thus
disproportionately impacts poor and Black defendants.
Michael Andrew Gary provides a telling example. Gary is a thirty-yearold, indigent Black male.141 He was represented in his Fourth Circuit
proceedings by a federal public defender.142 Gary had been previously
incarcerated when he was arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm in
South Carolina, there had been no violence involved, and he cooperated
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willingly with the arresting officers.143 He is now incarcerated again for
exercising a right to bear arms that is otherwise protected by the United States
Constitution for people who have not been convicted of a felony. And that
incarceration was based on his plea to behavior that, without the missing
Rehaif element, is simply not a crime.
CONCLUSION
Few issues in American political discourse are as divisive as gun
control. America no doubt has a gun violence problem to reckon with—
Americans have more firearms per capita and suffer more deaths from gun
violence than any other high income, populous nation.144 Thirty-nine
thousand Americans die every year from gun violence, or an average of 100
per day.145 Mass shootings have repeatedly shaken and devastated the
country; there were over 400 in 2019.146 Gun violence also disproportionately
impacts communities of color. Black men make up 52% of all gun homicide
victims in the United States, despite comprising less than 7% of the
population.147
While these devastating statistics fuel an ongoing debate about imposing
stricter gun control policies, lawmakers and gun control advocates must be
careful in constructing regulations to ensure that the impact is not racially
disparate, further contributing to the disarmament and mass incarceration of
Black Americans. It is also critical that gun control advocates recognize the
racialized narrative surrounding gun control in America and the racialized
history of such statutes as they craft policy that protects Americans from gun
violence through non-carceral solutions. Examination of existing gun control
statutes, such as § 922(g), and the ways that these laws have been racially
motivated is critical to rewriting the American gun control narrative and
moving toward effective, common-sense, gun control policy that does not
143
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inflict further harm on Black Americans. Addressing structural errors when
defendants charged with these statutes are deprived of their constitutional
rights is a part of rewriting that narrative.

